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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to trace the development of management accounting systems (MAS) in a 
Portuguese bank, where an activity based costing system (ABC) has been trialled for 
implementation over the past few years, as a means to improving the economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness of employee activity. This initiative can be located in a wider cultural change in 
Portuguese banking towards global (i.e. US derived) strategies and processes, but within an 
organizational world where older traditions remain powerful. The research undertaken here is a 
longitudinal case study of organisational change in one institution based on a critical-
interpretive model. Although drawing on the interpretive tradition since it is concerned with 
actors’ perceptions, interpretations and beliefs, it also draws on a more historically focused 
Foucault-inspired critical framework of the kind developed in the work of Hoskin and Macve 
(e.g. 1986, 1988, 1994, 2000), and in the research into the financial sector undertaken by 
Morgan and Sturdy (2000). The particular model developed here is designed to enable the 
exploration of the effect of accounting practices on change across time from three perspectives 
– changing structures, changing discourses and the effect of both of these processes on power 
relations.  
The research highlights the increase in visibility and perceived importance of accounting in the 
banking sector, and how accounting is significant beyond its technical roles. The study provides 
new insights into how management accounting practices, along with other organisational 
systems, play an important role questioning, visualising, analysing, and measuring 
implemented strategies. As the language and practice of management have shifted towards 
strategy and marketing discourses, patterns of work, organisation and career are being 
restructured, in often under-appreciated ways, by accounting practices. 
 
Keywords: implementation of change, activity based costing, financial services, case study. 
 
The first author gratefully acknowledges the financial support provided by the Foundation for Science and 
Technology – Portugal (FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia). 
 
Correspondence: Rui Vieira, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia, Campus de Campolide, 
1099-032 Lisboa – Portugal; E-mail: Rui.Vieira@fe.unl.pt 
 
  
 - 2 - 
1. Introduction 
This paper conducts a longitudinal case study that traces the implementation of an 
activity based costing (ABC) system in a Portuguese bank. There are previous 
studies, undertaken in the financial services sector in Europe, which have focused 
on the relation between management accounting systems (MAS) and 
organisational change. The study by Cobb et al. (1995) used Innes and Mitchell’s 
(1990) factorial model to study a UK-based division of a multinational bank. Soin 
(1996) also studied the change process in a UK clearing bank by drawing on 
Laughlin’s (1991) theoretical framework and later (Soin et al., 2002) on 
institutional theory (Burns and Scapens, 2000). Euske and Riccaboni (1999), using 
institutional theory (Fligstein, 1991), studied how an Italian bank managed 
interdependencies to meet a new environment. Norris (2002) carried grounded 
theory case studies in the implementation and usage of ABC in two UK Banks to 
identify factors related to implementation success. Nevertheless, there is still 
space for empirical research in other contexts, and other forms of interpretive 
approach, to make sense of the critiques (and their limitations) and to better 
understand the nature of management accounting practice (Hopwood, 1983; 
Kaplan, 1984; Scapens, 1990). The study here makes its contribution, by 
integrating interpretive and critical theory and using this integrative model in a 
non-English-speaking context to a critical understanding of accounting-based 
initiatives, as they develop in a range of new cultural contexts. It looks to build on 
the recent trend in accounting research to investigate the role and function of 
accounting practices on management practice and discourse. 
The paper looks to the changing banking context in the Portuguese financial 
services and how managers undergoing change use internal accounting system 
tools to facilitate the change process. The key research questions are: ‘what were 
the dynamics around the ABC proposal as its implementation proceeded, and what 
roles do (and can) MAS play in the organisation?’. To answer these research 
questions, a qualitative research design has been adopted, and a longitudinal case 
study approach, based on a Foucault-inspired critical framework of the kind 
developed in the work of Hoskin and Macve (e.g. 1986, 1988, 1994, 2000), and in 
the research into the financial sector undertaken by Morgan and Sturdy (2000). 
Such an approach is concerned with how far accounting practices (and their 
underlying procedures, deploying writing, examining and quantification processes 
to render entities and individuals accountable) have change effects, both 
anticipated and unanticipated. The focus in this study was on changing structures, 
changing discourses and the effect of both of these processes on power relations.  
The research can therefore be classified as a longitudinal case study of 
organisational change. But it is one which considers that the case should be 
understood not purely synchronically, in terms of the observations and interviews 
undertaken as the ABC implementation was unfolding, but also diachronically, 
locating these current events in a longer organisational and cultural past. It can 
also be seen as a descriptive/exploratory case, given the extension of analysis to a 
new cultural context. In this regard its objective may be taken as identifying 
possible reasons for the ways accounting practices change across time and space.  
The paper has seven main sections. In the second section, the theoretical 
framework developed by Morgan and Sturdy (2000) is presented. The third section 
considers the literature on the development of activity accounting in the financial 
service sector. After the methodology section, the context in which the ABC 
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system is being implemented, and also the implementation process itself, is 
analysed. Section six discusses the roles that management accounting play in the 
organisation, and section seven presents conclusions. 
2. Towards a Theoretical Framework for Bank Sector Research 
To understand the relations between MAS and organisational change, this research 
draws on a largely Foucault-derived approach into the relations between 
management practices and discourses developed by Morgan and Sturdy (2000), 
and applied by them to the financial services sector. They claim that organisational 
change can be studied from at least three different perspectives: managerialist, 
political and social (though for ‘the social’, one could perhaps read ‘the critical’). 
The managerialist approach offers prescriptions and techniques to help managers 
engineer change and control. In this way, the change process is reduced to a 
technical task that can only fail because of a lack of ability or persistence on the 
part of managers. This approach has long been criticised, however, for its weak 
analytical framework for understanding how and why organisations change 
(Pettigrew, 1995; Molinsky, 1999; Morgan and Sturdy, 2000). In response, the 
political approach attempts to understand the change process rather than simply 
prescribe how to achieve change, with Pettigrew’s (1987) work providing a 
significant advance in the study of organisational change. He criticises the 
‘acontextual, atheoretical and aprocessual’ nature of mainstream organisational 
change literature (Pettigrew, 1987:655) and proposes that ‘theoretically sound and 
practically useful research on change should explore the contexts, content, and 
processes of change together with their interconnectedness through time’ 
(Pettigrew, 1990:268).  
This is clearly a richer analytical approach than that adopted by managerialists. 
However, some critics have suggested that the political approach is not sufficient 
in practice. Here Morgan and Sturdy (2000:18) observe that even authors who 
adopt the political approach often ‘find themselves drawn into an uncritical 
managerialist framework, whereby the politics of the change process is examined 
using essentially the same categories of understanding as the actors themselves 
(which are invariably managerial)’. They therefore propose a ‘social’ or ‘critical’ 
approach which examines the ‘languages, concepts, categories and their 
associated practices which actors adopt to make sense of, construct and act in the 
world’ (p.18). This approach can be termed ‘critical’ since it is based in 
contemporary European critical theorising, and in particular, the work of Michel 
Foucault. The term discourse is used here in the pioneering sense used by 
Foucault, with a focus on the ‘range of things said’ at any given time in a particular 
‘discursive field’, and on the ways in which such ‘things said’ are the product of 
particular practices of communicating, learning, coordinating, controlling and so on 
– practices of inclusion and exclusion.  
The approach that Morgan and Sturdy (2000) articulate follows on from Foucault 
and the work just cited as arguing that we are, as historically situated beings, 
always already within discourse, as we begin as actors to explain ourselves, our 
actions and organisations to ourselves and others. In the third person,  
‘[b]odies of knowledge are constructed which are often transmitted and translated by 
organizational participants into routines and procedures which, in turn, constitute or 
contribute towards the construction of new or adapted knowledges and practices. These 
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bodies of knowledge become languages through which people speak about and understand 
organizational processes’ (Morgan and Sturdy, 2000:18-19).  
In this process, there are always principles of exclusion, reducing almost to zero 
the likelihood that certain things will be said – the principle of prohibition – the 
view of certain things as ‘mad’, but also as Foucault observes (1981:55), a ‘will to 
truth’ resting on institutional supports, pedagogy, libraries, learned societies and 
laboratories. This excludes certain possibilities as unlikely or implausible, leaving 
only certain other possibilities as ‘acceptable understandings of the world’. This 
critical approach can offer a new range of insights to how dominant forms of ‘true 
organisational discourse’ (e.g., concerning strategy and change) are constructed, 
insights that can complement and yet extend those offered by such approaches as 
institutional theory, psychodynamic theory or Marxism (see Hoskin, 1994, for a 
positive view of how Foucauldian work can complement Marx). 
Here the objective is to apply the Morgan and Sturdy approach not just to the 
bank but to the roles of accounting in banking specifically. Their study looked to 
the banking sector as a whole (not an organisation) and they did not studied 
accounting discourse, but only strategy and marketing discourses. This study 
draws on Hoskin and Macve’s identification of certain secondary practices as being 
at the heart of accounting and management (sc. writing, examining and grading) 
and looks to see how far such practices do shape the discursive field of modern 
management (cf. Hoskin and Macve, 1994).  
Organisational and economic contexts are increasingly seen by key managerial 
actors as complex and uncertain. The days of management as a science that 
imposes order through the exercise of certain essential truths have gone. One 
development has been the articulation of new and sophisticated discourses that 
are perceived to re-establish a sense of stability and control. Insofar as they 
succeed in constructing the business world’s complexity in their own image, they 
establish the truth of their presuppositions. Such new managerialist discourses 
include strategy and marketing, and, while their significance needs to be 
recognised, their strengths and weaknesses also need to be comprehended in 
developing a critical-interpretive understanding. Here Morgan and Sturdy (2000) 
again offer some initial steps towards such an understanding. 
Strategy has emerged over the past two generations as a dominant top-
management discourse for looking at the world, making sense of complex futures 
and offering a form of rational control over contexts. ‘Strategy has become the 
main language through which actors make sense of, respond to and thereby help 
realize changes. It has become an over-arching framework for actors and 
organizations, providing a language of ‘truth’ to make sense of the world’ (Morgan 
and Sturdy, 2000:122). Strategy typically generates a set of neatly co-ordinated 
(and often picturable) frameworks that assist the process of deciding and 
implementing specific strategic plans. Strategy complements these closed systems 
of planning-based control with a series of objective techniques to measure 
performance, tracking it against strategic goals and providing feedback. 
Management consultants now play a key role as the carriers and interpreters of 
strategy discourse, offering ‘tailored’ and ‘practical’ solutions, ‘self-reliance’, and 
the development of political skills to draw upon when conditions of stability are 
being undermined (Morgan and Sturdy, 2000). 
Strategy thus establishes a crucial link with marketing discourse, which has 
emerged as a key way of connecting the coordinated and managed inner context 
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of the organisation with the less manageable, fluctuating outer context. 
Competitive pressures have increasingly forced companies to address better the 
needs of consumers. Marketing provides mechanisms for understanding consumer 
needs, for segmenting them, and designing products and offers that exploit the 
relative efficacy and efficiency of particular distribution channels. This last step is 
crucial because meeting the needs of customers is only relevant and valuable so 
long as it can be done profitably. This creates tensions within marketing. At the 
same time, it drives marketing into the arms of strategy as it is forced to focus on 
identifying potentially profitable consumers and/or selecting profitable products or 
services. Much marketing activity concerns the avoidance of competition and the 
dominance of markets, that is, ‘marketing benefits the firm not by satisfying 
customers but by establishing quasi-monopolistic power over them’ (cf. 
Whittington and Whipp, 1992:54). 
This work ensures that the significance of such discourses can be recognised and 
appreciated when tracking the dynamics of change in the fieldwork process. At the 
same time, a Foucault-based approach does not look to privilege these discourses 
uncritically. In a sense, the emergence of these new discourses is not new. It is 
purely a modern, formalised way of ensuring that the basic financial ratio between 
revenues and costs is maximised as far as possible at any given time and over 
time. The discourses say new things, but within a disciplinary frame of knowledge. 
Disciplinary expertise is required to enable maximisation, not least within a sector 
in which all players find themselves one that is populated by strategy and 
marketing experts and their knowledge. Any initial competitive advantage is 
‘competed away’. Meanwhile there is no departure from the distinctive focus of 
banking on the underlying revenue-cost ratio.  
It is here that a new approach to understanding the role of MAS has something to 
offer. Even as strategy and marketing reach a mutually supportive position of 
discursive dominance, they continue to incorporate features of resistance. The 
critical literature on strategy indicates the extent to which strategy is a rhetoric of 
rationalisation, and even a logical contradiction in espousing rational planning 
(based on analysis of past events and trends) as a basis for succeeding in a future 
which will differ from the past both on probabilistic and logical grounds. In 
addition, what emerges when one considers what strategy and marketing focus on 
– revenue streams, profitability, return on investment, economic value added – is 
the centrality of accounting practices and numbers to the articulation and 
maintenance of these apparently dominant discourses.  
3. Activity Accounting and the Financial Services Sector 
The financial services sector is one that has developed dramatically on a global 
level over the past two decades. There has been a concentration towards fewer 
and larger entities both at a global level, with the growth of global capital and 
money markets, and in many countries at a national level as well. In this regard, 
the US has been a conspicuous mover of change, with the final revoking in the 
1980s of 1930s laws, passed after the 1929 Wall Street Crash, setting regional 
limits to banking conglomerates.  
One major outcome in the process of concentration, which has been largely 
prosecuted through merger and acquisition activity, has been an intensified focus 
on revenue generation alongside cost and manpower control in banks of all sizes. 
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There has been a search for more effective organisational forms to deliver these 
two objectives. Mabberley (1997:2) has summarised the situation as follows:  
‘[m]arkets are becoming increasingly competitive as institutions fight for profitable business 
and technology and deregulation allows other organizations to enter the markets. The 
constraints on profits and the need to find new ways to improve performance and compete 
successfully in the highly competitive financial services industry creates a need for the 
ability to review existing performance in relation to the external environment and identify 
ways to improve revenues or refocus costs to ensure greater profitability in both the short 
and longer term’. 
Banking is a sector where approaches like ABC, with its focus on making overhead 
costs visible, were always likely to be seen as attractive. This sector also 
recognises the significance of the critiques stemming back over a decade now, 
often summarised in the claim that conventional management accounting data is 
‘too late, too aggregated and too distorted to be relevant for planning and control 
decisions’ (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987:1). The classic or traditional bank structure 
has depended on a separation between front office and back office staff, which has 
meant that the activity of the latter in particular has been difficult to allocate to 
specific products or services. Further, the traditional branch structure, where the 
local manager has been responsible for the local set of front and back office staff 
and has been the key point of contact for local customers, has reinforced the 
overhead problem, and the consequent difficulty in capturing the costs of products 
and customers. Hence the traditional cost management approach, found in many 
different countries, of concentrating on the total cost/revenue ratio as the best 
index of bank ‘efficiency’.  
This context has led Sephton and Ward (1990:29) to observe that the situation of 
financial institutions is very like that of manufacturing industry, with both showing 
the characteristics that should make adoption of ABC attractive, namely: 
• ‘highly competitive market; 
• diversity of products, processes and customers; 
• significant overhead costs not easily assigned to individual products; 
• demands on overhead resources placed by individual products and customers 
not proportional to volume’. 
They go on to highlight three areas where ABC can benefit financial institutions. 
First, it can calculate ‘meaningful’ product costs. Second, this can then help 
dramatically in analysing profitability and understanding cost behaviour as part of 
the strategic management project. Third, it becomes possible to develop more 
effective budgeting, forecasting and performance measurement systems in 
traditional ‘overhead’ departments. Since, as they argue, financial institutions’ 
services do not have cost information requirements for external financial reporting 
or stock valuation, the major purposes for ABC introduction will be decision-
making and cost control. 
As managers are concentrating their attention on the costs that they can manage 
and beginning to link the cost/benefit analysis to the value chain, the potential for 
ABC to effect major beneficial change has therefore been seen as extremely 
promising. The ABC system 
‘leads to a better understanding of cost/resource management, emphasising the lag 
between spending and consumption by analysing the factors that cause the initial 
expenditure and monitoring the consumption of resources and capacity utilisation. It does 
not control the business, but simply provides information that influences the decision 
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makers in the management process by providing indicators that demonstrate the cost 
utilisation within the organisation’ (Mabberly, 1992:16). 
In such ways, consultancy discourse came, in the early 1990s, to exercise a 
considerable fascination for the banking sector, both within the US and 
internationally. There was a considerable interest in the possibility of ABC adoption 
in the financial sector, and there were clear and pressing reasons why this should 
have been so. Survey-based research may leave unclear precisely what motives 
banks had when they decided to implement an ABC approach, but they can show 
us that there was a high adoption rate in the financial sector during the 1990s, 
particularly among larger entities (e.g. Innes and Mitchell, 1995; Innes et al., 
2000). The reasons for such adoption may include the increasing competitiveness 
in the sector, or it may more simply be a result of a number of large organisations 
in the sector, all with the resources to implement substantial and costly change 
initiatives. Fashion and fad factors often lead to a ‘follow-my-leader’ adoption of 
new approaches, and the influence of consultants and practical ‘how-to’ guides in 
locations like the Harvard Business Review may have been significant too (cf. 
Mabberly, 1992, 1997). At the same time, it is important to recall that ABC was 
always going to present itself as a far superior way of managing costs and 
activities to traditional overhead-based MAS systems (cf. Innes and Mitchell, 
1997).   
4.  Methodology 
The case was undertaken in a Portuguese bank facing significant competition and 
reshaped by new discourses, particularly those concerned with ‘strategy’, 
‘marketing’, and ‘change’. It is a large family-owned Portuguese bank, whose 
foundation dates back to the XIX century.  To observe agreements of 
confidentiality for all research activities the bank will be named as ‘Banco 
Lusitano’. The bank was nationalised following the fall of the Salazar regime in the 
1970s, but re-privatised in the early 1990s, at which point the original family 
regained control. This was part of a general privatisation of financial houses, and 
this economic shift led, as in other countries, to a greater focus on profitability, 
cost control and efficiency and effectiveness of client services than hitherto. In this 
respect, an old business culture (dating back before nationalisation, but artificially 
prolonged by it) was suddenly confronted with new economic demands.  
Initial contact was made with the bank in January 1998 through the accounting 
department. The initial purpose was to negotiate access. The bank was willing to 
give generous access, with a full range of materials being made available (under 
the usual terms of confidentiality, where appropriate) and with interviews being 
granted with a wide range of relevant bank employees. The research is not time 
constrained in the sense that the conclusions are valid independently of the 
events. Nevertheless, it was carried out between April 1998 and April 2001, 
primarily within the accounting and organisation departments. In-depth, face-to-
face, semi-structured interviews with key people in the bank formed an important 
source of information. Interviewees were selected on the basis of their position in 
key areas of the organisation or their involvement in the change initiatives that 
have occurred since re-privatisation, especially, the ABC project. The first stage of 
the main research was conducted during July and August 1999. It involved 22 
open-ended interviews with members of the bank’s central departments, and of 
regional and branch offices. The second stage was conducted between July 2000 
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and April 2001. The main data sources for studying the implementation of the ABC 
system were consultancy reports and memos, and 19 open-ended interviews (13 
in July and August 2000, 4 in January 2001 and 2 in April 2001) with people 
involved in the development of ABC. These were contacts from the organisation 
department, accounting department, and externally the Consultant Company and 
the Information Technology Company. All interviews were conducted in Portuguese 
and most of the questions were asked in an open-ended fashion to enable 
interviewees to respond in their own words. Interviews lasted on average 75 
minutes and were tape-recorded. In one case, the interviewee did not give 
permission for the interview to be taped so notes were taken. 
5. The Research Case: Background and Issues 
Before the 1960s, Portugal’s banking sector was, like the economy in general, 
relatively underdeveloped. During the half-century of corporatist dictatorship 
(1926-1974), the state played a custodial role and gradually influenced every 
aspect of economic, political and social life. It ensured a stable economic context 
but considerably reduced flexibility and innovation. After the revolution in 1974, 
the change to a democratic regime was not accompanied by a transformation in 
terms of the state apparatus. The large state sector became associated with the 
‘conquest of the revolution’, and the 1976 Constitution assumed a highly 
interventionist role of the state and approved the irreversibility’ of the large 
nationalised sector. Corkill (1999:56-57) maintains that 
‘[u]nder state control, the public enterprise sector performed poorly, turning in large 
operating losses, voraciously devouring public subsidies and ensuring that productivity 
increases remained stubbornly low. A large public sector did serve to preserve the infant 
democracy’s social achievements but, by placing political and social priorities before 
commercial considerations, great stains were imposed on the productive structure and on 
the public finances’. 
The state played a dominant role while the financial sector was in this situation, 
and the Bank of Portugal acted as the crucial mediator between the state and the 
financial institutions. As a result, there was a strong discourse of regulation and 
hierarchy, rather than of markets and competition.  
In 1985 the state started a progressive deregulation process that changed some of 
the rules of the sector1, characterised by new entrants, plus a gradual but long-
term move towards merger and acquisition activity, and the expansion by all 
major participants into a wider range of investment banking, insurance, leasing 
and other lines of business. By the 1990s the relatively protected and regulated 
Portuguese banking sector had begun to change more rapidly, with the result that 
the previously highly protected banks are now competing with new institutions and 
have become part of the progressively integrated European market for financial 
services.  
Portugal’s accession to the EC, favourable external factors (e.g., falling oil and raw 
material prices, declining interest rates, and economic aid from Brussels), and the 
                                                     
1 The Stock Exchange was modernised, and trade in new money market instruments was sanctioned. 
Legal authorisation was given for the establishment of domestically and foreign-owned private banks, 
and their number multiplied quickly. Credit ceilings were abolished for commercial banks, and the 
public sector banks that had been nationalised were now privatised. 
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political stability provided by the first single-party majority government, gave the 
opportunity to change the country’s public institutions and structures. Privatisation 
began to reduce the size of the public sector, starting with the financial sector – 89 
per cent of the financial sector was state-owned in 1989 compared to just 15 per 
cent in the manufacturing sector (Corkill, 1999). The financial sector again became 
a major source of investment and interest for the leading private groups, many of 
them being continuations of old groupings. In the initial phase of liberalisation, the 
activity and profitability of the financial sector increased significantly. In the early 
1990s, the banking sector was contributing 8.5 per cent to GDP, a comparatively 
high percentage as an international comparison. However, profit margins have 
now fallen back, even though activity remains high, as the market has filled up 
with participants competing in both domestic and foreign markets, chasing lower 
costs and higher market share. Credit ceilings were abolished and the European 
Union II Banking Directive was adopted, which ‘led to full entry liberalization, as 
far as branches of EU credit institutions and the cross-border provision of financial 
services by EU credit institutions are concerned’ (Ministry of Finance, 1998:43). As 
the 1990s progressed, new financial conglomerates were created. These included 
banks, finance companies and insurance companies. Foreign banks, particularly 
from Spain increased their presence. Nevertheless, the state still is a very 
important player in the sector, especially as it continues controlling, either directly 
or indirectly, the most important financial group in the country. 
5.1. Banco Lusitano 
In the 1990s the bank was re-privatised and the Lusitano group (the financial 
group of the family which had controlled the bank prior to its nationalisation in 
1975) obtained a 50 per cent voting control of the bank shares and of the bank 
board of directors (Pohl and Freitag, 1994). The bank’s owners were therefore 
looking for competitive advantage in the new economic climate for the Portuguese 
banking sector, and looked to such internationally adopted innovations as 
diversification of services and growth through merger and acquisition – all 
designed to maintain a healthy balance sheet and profit and loss account. The 
pursuit of these goals has continued up to the present, and Banco Lusitano has 
secured its position as one of the country’s leading banks, with a wide range of 
overseas interests. The bank has set up subsidiaries and representative offices in 
cities where there is a significant Portuguese community, and has entered the 
Spanish and Brazilian markets.  
After the bank’s return to the private sector, the new board of directors began the 
restructuring of the equity holding portfolio. The bank would act as the co-
ordination centre for a global financial group, around which would be assembled 
operating units specialised along product lines and devoted to the extension of 
high-quality financial services, aimed at their own specific market and business 
segments. Prominent in the group are those units more directly dedicated to 
financial services (e.g. banking, insurance), but also there has been an expansion 
of those units arising from the bank’s restructuring process (e.g. outsourcing 
units), or whose purpose is the extension of ancillary services in the financial area 
(ancillary service units and subsidiaries whose purpose is limited to acting as 
finance vehicles). The financial group covers a range of business areas ranging 
from banking to property and equipment leasing, insurance, factoring, investment 
and pension fund management, credit cards and stock brokerage, among others. 
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5.2. Change Initiatives  
Since the bank was newly committed to profitability and cost control, one major 
concern that began to emerge, and remained a high priority across the 1990s, was 
over the head-count. Naturally this was not necessarily something that the bank’s 
top management wanted to broadcast; but from 1992 there were a number of 
initiatives undertaken, with the help of leading consultancy firms, where in 
retrospect it can be seen that a major objective was a reduction in the head-count 
and, associated with that, an improvement in the cost to income ratio (operating 
expenses/banking earnings). With the growing adoption of internationally used 
financial performance measurement systems, this ratio increasingly became a 
major concern to banks and to financial sector analysts as a proxy for efficient and 
profitable operations. According to a bank report, in order to increase profitability, 
market share and productivity, 
‘the Bank has sought to strengthen its position within the Portuguese commercial banking 
sector by (i) increasing the penetration of its existing client base through enhanced 
customer service, (ii) substantially expanding its commercial banking network to 
accommodate increasing demand and ensure adequate marketing capabilities and (iii) 
consolidating its existing operations in an effort to control expenses and boost productivity’ 
(Annual Report: Form 20-F, 1997). 
The bank was determined to increase revenue but simultaneously to cut costs, 
which would require a leaner structure. Consequently, the bank undertook a series 
of ‘commercial reorganisation’ and ‘efficiency-focussed’ projects. The largest 
projects were the rationalisation carried out in the branch network (the Excellence 
Project) and in the central departments (the Efficiency Project):  
‘On the organizational side, we draw attention to the rationalization carried out in the 
branch network (the Excellence Project), and in the central departments (the Efficiency 
Project), as also within internal services (Complementary Grouping of Companies), while at 
the same time we intensified the process of horizontal and vertical communication between 
the Group management structures, with particular emphasis on the travelling executive 
committees and the Group conferences. At the same time, we took some important steps 
towards modernizing the new information system, with some of its modules now in 
operation’ (Report and Accounts, 1997). 
In addition, there were projects reviewing commercial banking, best practice, and 
information technology. Over the same period, the head-count was reduced from 
approximately 6,325 in 1992 to 4,962 in 1998, while the cost to income ratio 
improved, from 67.7 per cent in 1995 to 57.5 per cent in 1998. The bank’s 
efficiency also improved substantially over the period, with total assets per 
employee increasing from PTE 465 million in 1995 to 918 million in 1998. 
As these change initiatives were taking place, and the implications of the new 
structure became increasingly clear to bank employees, one consequence was a 
‘discursive shift’, first in official documents, and then in the vocabulary adopted by 
managers (i.e. the range of things said and those not said). This can, in general, 
be characterised as a move towards a more internationally recognisable kind of 
‘financial management’ phrasing and vocabulary. Terminology stressing 
profitability, unit cost reduction, quality, rationalisation and radical change became 
widespread, whereas before this such terminology had been rare. Thus, in the 
Report and Accounts for 1997 we find such observations as the following: 
  
 - 11 - 
‘The plans for change are clearly coming together, as on the one hand we increase our 
ability to generate business and hence earnings, and on the other hand, as we reduce our 
unit costs of production’. 
The Excellence Project was put into operation with the aim of improving the quality and 
competitiveness of the Group’s services, ‘directed mainly toward the distribution network, 
the segmentation of our clientele, and adapting the customer service to that segmentation’. 
The Efficiency Project was ‘designed to reduce transformation costs through slimming down 
the logistical support services, to reduce costs and redesign processes, bearing in mind the 
changes introduced by the NISI’. With the Efficiency Project ‘we simplified, rationalized and 
redesigned the circuits, and automated and centralized processes, while linking Group 
companies more closely to the process of monitoring customer satisfaction on a continuing 
basis’. 
The NISI was ‘designed to make radical changes in hardware and software, in order to 
respond to the needs of running the organization in an up-to-date way’.  
As the process of organisational and discursive change has gathered momentum 
and been maintained now for the best part of a decade, bank employees have not 
been slow to realise what has been happening. Some of this has followed as a 
natural consequence of a change in personnel, with new people entering who buy 
into the new discourse more automatically. But additionally those who have stayed 
on have embraced the new kind of discourse and the practices that go with it, 
while they have also had to accept that there is an increase in job insecurity under 
the new more ‘competitive’ regime.  
Unsurprisingly, there has been a considerable increase in suspicion of the motives 
of top management when initiatives promoting ‘improvement’ have been set up, 
particularly among older employees. At the same time, a new spirit of 
competitiveness has begun to be disseminated at the everyday level with the 
setting of targets, both financial non-financial, e.g. with the framing of new 
objectives such as increasing the percentage of ‘high-value’ customers.  
In this process, there has been some considerable reorganisation of the bank’s 
structure. In the mid-1990s there was a geographically-based reorganisation of 
the management structure below top management, with the introduction of 
regional divisions, and with a related focus on revamping the work patterns in 
branches, so that branches became more of a ‘one-stop shop’ for a range of 
services and the first point of call for most services that the average customer 
might want or be persuaded to consider. Separate ‘corporate banking’ and ‘private 
banking’ divisions were also set up for high net worth customers. Thus, strategy 
and marketing discourses became the accepted language through which senior 
managers articulated their decision-making processes and justified their outcomes. 
The following ‘key strategic messages’ from the Report and Accounts for 2000, are 
an example of these discourses:  
‘To extend our client base and consequently our market share has at all times been an 
intermediate goal for the Group; the development of our presence in markets having 
affinities with Portugal was also a strategic vehicle that we have reinforced in order to meet 
this goal. 
Our commercial performance is therefore guided by the underlying objective of delivering 
maximum value to our customers, and based on a relational marketing approach and the 
continuous effort to improve efficiency levels. The increase in value generated is shared 
with the agents involved (employees, customers and shareholders), thus fostering an 
increasingly concerned and long-lasting relationship. 
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At the same time and intimately connected to these guidelines, we note the initiatives 
taken to fully use the potential afforded by the new technologies, which provide a faster 
and more efficient means both for the communication between the Group and its customers 
and for carrying out transactions and business’. 
This was not the extent of the change. To capture efficiencies, the IT function was 
outsourced (although it is not clear that this has been a total success). Certainly 
within the bank, many employees see problems, such as bottlenecks and lack of 
timely information, as due to the outsourcing of the IT function. The situation has 
not been helped with a changeover in the software used, which has sometimes led 
to ‘black holes’ in the provision of data to departments.  
Thus, the 1990s were a decade of major transformation, with all the new 
opportunities and the associated problems that such transformation brings. 
5.3. The Original Management Accounting System 
The original MAS was largely budget-driven, supported by a system of objectives 
and incentives (SOI). The budgetary control system had been in place for some 
considerable time, and additionally was an evolved version of an older incremental 
budgeting system, which had been in place before the re-privatisation of the early 
1990s. The evolved version includes a ‘tableau de bord’ where special attention is 
paid to certain key targets, especially return on equity and the cost to income 
ratio. An effort to motivate managers to strive to achieve the budget goals led to 
the development of a system of objectives and incentives (SOI). 
The SOI was introduced initially only for the commercial area as a key means of 
inducing more effort to achieve goals (in order to receive associated rewards) and 
to guide this effort into directions that are valuable for the bank. It provided a 
monetary bonus for achieving short-term targets giving positive direction and 
motivation. The objective was to develop a greater competitiveness and 
commercial awareness at the ‘sharp end’ of the business, in the branches. The 
targets set (along with the potential incentives for success) are increasingly driving 
the activities of managers and employees in the branches. There is an increased 
focus on sales and short-term profit. Targets are related to commercial 
effectiveness (measured by the degree that commercial objectives are reached) 
and profitability (measured by business volume with standard margins defined by 
product). Profitability is assessed in terms of the evolution of cost to income, i.e. 
the cost to income ratio is compared with the ratio for the same period in the 
previous year. 
A big problem that quickly emerged with the SOI (and one that had not been 
solved before the advent of the ABC initiative) was that the bank did not have the 
tools to calculate actual product margins. Consequently, since commercial staff 
can squeeze margins in order to do more business, and the system does not 
translate that through actual margins, the results reported can create a perceived 
unfairness in the attribution of performance rewards. As a manager from the 
commercial area put it: 
‘Profitability is just a volume effectiveness because a standard margin is used, which is 
totally mismatched; it should be the actual margin. Someone who does good credit 
management and practice interest rates above the bank’s average, in terms of profitability 
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is in the same situation as someone who squeezes interest rates. It is not a profitability 
measure; we should have combined the volume growth with actual interest rates'.  
In 1999, a SOI was also created for central departments. Although benefiting from 
the experience in the commercial area, this system was difficult to set due to the 
different activities in the central departments, ranging from operative to logistics 
and support. Therefore the overhead allocation problem was posed particularly 
acutely. The provisional solution was to set four types of targets, each related to 
costs that were measurable, rather than costs that were relevant. First, efficiency 
targets were set measured in terms of workforce reduction and redesign of 
processes. Secondly, cost targets were set measured in terms of budget 
execution. Thirdly, quality targets were set, measured through a questionnaire to 
internal clients regarding the quality of service. Finally, commercial targets and the 
global effectiveness of branches were set, but only for the two marketing 
departments (strategic and operational). Along with this set of targets, the system 
required an evaluation of each individual’s performance conducted by the senior 
manager of the department, which also affected the individual reward. In addition 
to the problems with the ‘objective’ reward system, this added a perception of 
potential subjectivity and unfairness in the attribution of rewards, while imposing 
significant burden of time and stress on those managers.  
5.4. The Activity-Based Costing Project 
The 1990s were a decade of major transformation, with many new opportunities 
and the associated problems that such transformation brings. It was in this 
context that an ABC initiative was suggested, influenced by the consultancy firm 
involved previously in innovations. The basic idea was that it should be piloted 
initially in one operational sector of the bank. Beyond the initial trial, which was 
due to begin in 1998, the intention was that, if successful, it should be rolled out 
across the bank as a means of further enhancing efficiency and effectiveness. It 
was not clear to many bank employees why they wanted to implement ABC. 
However, it appears that some managers were already voicing concerns about the 
lack of product cost information, and at the same time there was a strong price 
pressure from the increasing competition between banks, driving a perceived need 
to cut margins. There were also widespread concerns about the lack of 
‘information’ for management (especially about profitability), the lack of 
comparability between information from different sources, and the lack of 
timeliness of the information that was available.  
5.4.1. Pre-Implementation 
The implementation of ABC was due to start in 1998. However the project was 
successively deferred during 1998 and 1999. There were various reasons 
advanced for this delay, including such factors as the currency switch to the Euro 
and the Y2K ‘millennium bug’ problem. In the context of the introduction of the 
new currency, the bank had to adapt its operations, especially in the information 
systems area. Although the new currency only entered into circulation in January 
2002, January 1999 was identified as the benchmark for the Euro programme.  
However, there were other more deep-seated reasons. It is obvious that there 
  
 - 14 - 
were power relations issues between departments, in particular the potential ‘turf’ 
struggle between the accounting and the organisation departments. By early 1999 
it was clear that the latter department was in line to mount and co-ordinate the 
implementation of ABC, were it to go ahead, and this clearly precipitated a 
boundary dispute not only over who owned ‘accounting’ within the firm but also 
who owned the ‘significant’ accounting. A manager from another department 
summed up the dynamics of the situation: 
‘There are two forces and two different interpretations of control, definitions of costs and 
information systems… that also has to do with the history of the bank. Till a few years ago 
the accounting department was responsible for planning, so they intervened almost in 
everything. Today, the bank is facing great change, which is not as clear as is desirable. It 
also has to do with an historical issue, let things run…’. 
However, in the early stages, it was not clear whether or how far this potential 
conflict would materialise, since as the series of delays perhaps suggested, there 
was a noticeable lack of commitment to the proposal from top management, as a 
manager from the organisation department involved in proposing the ABC project 
observed: 
‘They [the executive committee] know much about banking, they are bankers in the real 
sense of the word, but they are not too sensitive to efficiency. They have a feeling that 
control of efficiency is important, but as they do not know the basic concepts they are not 
too demanding in that subject’. 
‘The administration wants to reduce costs and become a more efficient bank, but to do that 
it is necessary to change structures and processes. Although they want that, they are afraid 
of going too far in terms of change inside the bank. That is a constraint’.  
5.4.2. Implementation 
In January 2000 the bank decided to start the implementation of ABC. The formal 
reason was that ABC could be a relevant data provider for the Management 
Information System (MIS). The tender for service presented by the consultancy 
company eventually selected stated that Banco Lusitano had contacted them to 
help implement ABC as part of the MIS. The aim was to provide ‘more accurate 
costs, in order to manage profitability of products, customer segments and 
distribution channels. Additionally, it also permits the identification of potential 
improvements in terms of efficiency’ (Consultancy Reports: ABC Project). The 
consultants perceived that for the bank, the reduction of financial margins 
(spread) made it necessary to find new sources of profitability and gains in 
productivity. This meant searching for more profitable customer segments, 
developing new products, and using less expensive distribution channels.  
Another important aim (the most important for the organisation department) was  
Activity Based Management (ABM) in order to reengineer business processes, 
particularly those that did not add value to customers. Control of cost had become 
a key issue in the bank and ABC was seen as a potential device to induce 
behavioural incentives to be more cost conscientious. ABC was perceived to be a 
‘cost saving identification’ device. Complementary to these objectives, it also was 
expected to provide better information to help the budgeting process. 
Potential conflict was initially deflected by appointing the two departments as 
formal co-sponsors for the project, with the accounting department in charge of 
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developing the new MIS, and the organisation department in charge of 
reengineering processes. Nevertheless it was apparent that in key respects the 
latter was in a stronger position, not only in terms of being more in tune with the 
project but also in terms of the roles of people involved and levels of direct 
responsibility over the project.  
At the same time, there was an extraneous reason why, after the earlier delays, 
top management saw the project as timely. This was because they were 
considering a potential merger with a rival bank. This suddenly provided a new 
reason why there was a felt need for a better understanding of the costs involved, 
in order to ensure the merger would be a commercial success.  
Once this circumstance had raised top management interest, it appears that a 
more general interest developed in ABC as a promising method for assigning the 
bank’s operating expenses to its varied products, customer segments, and 
distribution channels (in 1998, 52.3 per cent of the operating costs were not 
allocated to responsibility centres). One perceived attraction of ABC was the way 
its language centred on cost awareness and unit costs, and was increasingly seen 
to fit with the marketing-focussed strategy.  
Consequently, the decision was finally made to bring in a consultancy company to 
implement the model in conjunction with internal staff. The system was developed 
in two phases. The first phase focussed on working in the branch network because 
it was technically easier to study their activities and they represented 43.3 per 
cent of the operating costs. Furthermore, it was easier to make progress with this 
research, because the organisation department had already undertaken an activity 
analysis in branches during previous reorganisation change initiatives. The second 
phase then involved the extension of the model to analyse activity in the central 
departments. 
The ABC project was developed and implemented with a clear dependence on 
technical and consultancy expertise, but in a way that turned out in practice often 
to be very ad hoc. There were problems in estimating the level of top management 
support and enthusiasm. There were technical problems with the quality of 
information available. There were also lurking organisational problems such as the 
fear that this was just a new way of reducing headcount, and the potential turf war 
between the accounting and organisation departments. Consequently, the 
implementation process did not proceed smoothly. Many workers did not have a 
very clear sense of what was involved in working under an ABC regime, and the 
initiative did not always have the necessary support of key managers. Eventual 
resistance from the head of a department could induce managers from that 
department to be lukewarm or even obstructive towards ABC.  
These are all clearly significant factors in making the ABC implementation process 
so difficult to manage and subject to delays. But one might also suggest that 
overall, when one looks at the complex nature of change in an organisation such 
as Banco Lusitano, the evolutionary four-stage model presented by Kaplan and 
Cooper (1998) was arguably too schematic and insufficiently contextually aware – 
too much a technical model that was not prepared to cope with the complexities of 
organisational dynamics. 
5.4.3. The Activity-Based Costing Output System 
  
 - 16 - 
The ABC system was developed as a stand-alone system that would interface with 
other systems to obtain the data it required (including the ‘data warehouse’). 
Some of the data that were to be produced by the ABC system (e.g. standard unit 
costs by product, customer segment, or distribution channel) were to be fed into 
the data warehouse in order to obtain the expected MIS profitability models. The 
final structure for understanding costs articulated out of the ABC project is 
summarised in Figure 1. It can be seen that what the team had come up with was 
cost models for four separate areas of activity, which together produced an 
‘Aggregated Model’. There was one for the ‘Commercial Network’, another one for 
the ‘Central Departments’ and there was a separate model for the costs of 
‘Projects’2. Finally there was a model for dealing with those residual costs defined 
by Kaplan and Cooper as ‘facilities sustaining’, where there was no possible 
‘causal’ relation to particular products or services, and where there had to be 
‘negotiated drivers’, i.e. what traditional overhead analysis understands as the 
‘arbitrary’ apportionment or allocation of costs on a judgement basis.  
The other three models could, however, operate as ‘causal’ systems with three 
modules of analysis, concerned respectively with resources, activities and cost 
objects. Within each model, in standard ABC fashion, the expenses of each 
business unit were now collected into activities, and then, through the appropriate 
cost drivers, the expenses accumulated in activities could be assigned to products, 
customer segments, and  distribution channels. The system arrived at what could 
therefore, in addition to providing a form of the three-dimensional vision of costs 
by cost object, provide data about costs by responsibility centre (including a 
breakdown into direct and indirect costs). It could also enable a cost analysis by 
‘activities’ and ‘processes’.  
In terms of the first of these categorisations, there were three ‘activity’ levels 
identified: macro-activities, activities and tasks. The perceived pay-off from this 
form of categorisation was that, on this basis, a Porter-style ‘value chain’ could be 
constructed for the bank. These macro-activities could then be broken down at the 
level of a particular department into specific ‘activities’, thus encapsulating the 
core of the ABC philosophy. It was accepted, as the result of pressure from the 
organisation department, that analysis at the ‘activity’ level alone would be 
insufficient to capture the information necessary to run an effective ABM system, 
thus the need to have a further division based on tasks (or third-level activities) 
for central departments.  
The perceived outcome of this whole process was that managers could now 
identify which processes were adding value to the customer and which were not, 
and how the efficiency of different processes could be improved. In addition to the 
focus on process improvements, the ABC team was able to produce detailed cost 
information reports on a range of other bases. So they identified approximately 40 
products or groups of closely related products, eight customer segments according 
to the marketing strategy of the bank, and four business channels (branches, 
telephone banking, ATMs, and internet banking).  
                                                     
2 The ABC team decided to create a specific model to deal with IT costs and costs from other 
development projects which typically only produced benefits across several years. This was a 
particularly acute and pressing example of the general problem since such costs already represented 
21.8 per cent of operating costs, and the trend of the previous few years was for these costs to 
increase in proportion, as the bank was becoming more technological.  
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Finally, given the way they solved the cost allocation problem in terms of the four 
models that made up the ‘Aggregated Model’, all expenses could be shown to have 
been assigned to the cost objects, since the residual indirect costs had been 
captured in the ‘Costs to Allocate’ module. The costs involved included accounting, 
human resource management, and other costs not directly related to any cost 
object, but which supported the bank as a whole, costs which in total accounted 
for 26.3 per cent of the bank’s 1999 operating expenses [The ‘negotiated drivers’, 
as noted, remained an example of arbitrary or judgmental decision-making]. 
The identification of ‘activities’ and the attachment of costs to those activities was 
in large part not seen as problematic. But there remain questions about the 
traceability of many costs relating to property and other facilities, which were 
classified as business-sustaining or related to macro-activity facilities management 
and represented 18.1 per cent of the 1999 operating expenses. 
Furthermore, when the staff involved in the implementation of the project took a 
wider view on what was ‘really’ going on, they often made comments to the effect 
that reported costs by cost objects ‘do not reflect reality’ as they seem 
‘unrealistically high’. One particular ‘cause’ fastened on to explain the ‘distrusted 
numbers’ was concern about accuracy in terms of output volumes. That is not to 
say that this was the real problem. The analysis above indicates that while this 
was undoubtedly an issue, there were a number of other significant problems and 
tensions in play. In addition, it is apparent that the IT company, as the outsider 
providing resources on an outsourced basis, was often a convenient scapegoat 
when things went wrong. Nonetheless, the overall conclusion has to be that, while 
a lot of work had gone in to the ABC project, and a lot of progress had been made, 
there were a lot of existing problems that had not been resolved, and perhaps 
some that had been exacerbated. 
One may simply observe that the implementation model was characterised by an 
analysis of activity structure that was far short of ideal (both in terms of the 
number of activities identified and the understanding of the relative weight or 
significance of the various activities). It had developed cost ‘drivers’ to allocate 
costs to cost objects that for various reasons were approximate, and gaining less 
than total confidence, when the means for recording volumes of activities were not 
automated.  
It retained a perceived potential to understand outputs in terms of costs by 
activities and so to enable a new quality of activity management (as ABM), 
generating a series of benchmarks enabling the optimisation of commercial 
structures and processes. It was also possible to read off from the final report 
submitted that the consultants envisaged the bank as being able to ‘upgrade’ the 
model over time. The vision remains that it would be possible to develop an 
activity analysis that would reflect how things did run (and should run), to identify 
the drivers enabling an ‘exact’ allocation of costs to cost objects, and to automate 
data capture systems that would accurately track the volumes of key activities. In 
that case it would be possible to have relevant unit-level costs by product, 
customer segments, and distribution channels, which coincidentally were the 
outcomes that the bank was initially looking for from the project.  
The report recognises that achieving these goals would not be straightforward. It 
stresses that maintaining and upgrading the model would be ‘complex and time 
consuming’. Maintaining the system and keeping it up-to-date on an on-going 
basis would require a significant amount of work due to the dynamic, changing 
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nature of the organisation and a continuing need for collaboration and cooperation, 
even while there was a climate of potential conflict with turf battles ahead. There 
were two distinct but linked issues, which are captured in the following observation 
by one member of the consultancy team: 
‘At this moment, our concern from the organisation department’s point of view is to update 
the structure, activities and times of the model. That allows taking advantage of the 
involvement in the ABC model of the remaining departments of the bank’. 
In other words there was an information quality issue, since the department was 
largely using data from 1999, and by mid-2001 the structure of the bank, its 
activities and the times used to perform them had already changed, along with 
other data used in the model. But even if that issue was resolved, there was still 
the ongoing problem of the relations between the organisation and accounting 
departments. Beyond that, it was not clear what would happen to the project, 
since this depended on the importance that top management attached to it. 
Consequently, the real impact and value of ABC was not clear, and as a result 
there were different levels of involvement in, and commitment to, the project. It 
appears that the bank departments involved, until the end of the implementation, 
did not discuss the uses to which the information would be put in any detail, and 
the contradictions between the positions held on the new system were evident to 
all involved. 
6.  Discussion 
Strategy discourse can be seen, across the banking sector, as having helped to 
identify the need for organisational restructuring from the analysis and claims of 
marketing information and perspectives. The discourse of strategy engaged neatly 
with the neo-liberal political discourse of market freedom, as entry barriers within 
the financial services were dismantled. There was a sense of ‘inevitability’, as the 
country was required to meet increasing competition from other European 
countries. Within Banco Lusitano specifically, after its return to the private sector, 
there was a restructuring of the equity holdings portfolio. As the 1997 Annual 
Report states, looking back to that period: 
‘a global financial group was developed, in which [Banco Lusitano] would act as the 
control tower, around which would be assembled or created, operating units specialized 
along product lines and devoted to the extension of high-quality financial services, aimed 
at their own specific market and business segments. 
The Group’s mission is thus to its clientele, both retail and corporate, a high degree of 
satisfaction appropriate to the market’s ever-growing requirements in terms of 
information and sophistication’ (Report and Accounts, 1997). 
In such a strategy-infused discourse, management consultants are likely to be 
seen as key helpers, and thereby act as crucial carriers of the discourse still more 
deeply into everyday organisational reality. It is reasonable to say that Banco 
Lusitano implemented several change initiatives with the help of management 
consultants, where strategy has become ‘the main language through which actors 
make sense of, respond to and thereby help realize changes’ (Morgan and Sturdy, 
2000:122). But at the same time, the kind of strategy just outlined, with its 
emphasis on satisfying its ‘clientele both retail and corporate’, and on offering this 
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clientele a range of services both ‘comprehensive and specialised’, inevitably 
meant that marketing discourse became a key aspect of the emerging strategic 
discourse.  
Again, the 1997 Report and Accounts bear this out, as the bank highlights the 
‘fundamental aspects’ of its commercial strategy as (1) aiming to improve its 
knowledge of customers, (2) pursuing a multi-channel strategy, and (3) promoting 
awareness of the brand. Regarding the bases of commercial performance: 
‘Since reprivatization, we have changed the traditional focus on products to one more 
oriented towards the client, with a strong emphasis on segmentation. At a second phase, 
we conceived the role of the segment manager in each branch for individual clients and 
for small and medium-sized companies. In a subsequent phase, we adapted the product 
delivery function to the segmentation process, enriching it with Group company 
products, made available through a network that was substantially expanded, 
remodelled, supplemented by alternative channels, to which better-qualified and 
versatile personnel were assigned’. 
As competition increases and the environment changes, marketing inevitably 
becomes an integral aspect of the emerging strategic discourse and set of 
practices, even if there is still a strong influence of a sales orientation. Marketing 
provides mechanisms for understanding and segmenting consumer needs, for 
designing products and offers which analyse the relative efficacy and efficiency of 
particular distribution channels, and for overcoming the weakness of a sales 
orientation through designing products more related to specific customer needs 
(Morgan and Sturdy, 2000). The bank reflects this, in its claims that it 
‘seeks to extend to its clientele a high degree of satisfaction by providing financial 
services that meet the market’s ever-growing requirements in terms of information and 
sophistication. 
Our commercial performance is therefore guided by the underlying objective of 
delivering maximum value to our customers, and based on a relational marketing 
approach and the continuous effort to improve efficiency levels. The increase in value 
generated is shared with the agents involved (employees, customers and shareholders), 
thus fostering an increasingly concerned and long-lasting relationship’ (Report and 
Accounts, 2000).  
None of this is to say that this kind of marketing discourse is either natural, 
inevitable or even necessarily effective. At the same time, it flourishes through a 
process of ‘naturalisation’, e.g. through consultancy and routinisation (Morgan and 
Sturdy, 2000).  
At the same time, there are some contradictions in terms of marketing discourse. 
Besides difficulties of specifying customer needs, meeting the needs of the 
customer only works as long as they can be met profitably, as a manager from the 
marketing department explains how he understands the importance of ABC for the 
bank: 
‘activity-based costing will allow more accountability to each process. There are products 
that are very profitable and subsidise areas that are less profitable or even unprofitable. 
If we had reliable management information the correct decision would be to close those 
areas’. 
This requires selecting profitable products and profitable customers, but in a 
market where everyone else is pursuing the same targets with similar marketing-
led strategic approaches. So the business theory is easy. Kotler (1997), for 
example, claims that segments should be ‘substantial’ (profitable) as well as 
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‘accessible’, ‘measurable’ and ‘actionable’, with each market segment justifying 
exploitation in terms of return on investment. Gordon (1998) spells out similar 
implications in more detail.3 In practice, however, first-mover advantages get 
competed away, and as more and more sectoral players follow the same 
prescriptions, there are sector-level effects, e.g. customers in general feeling that 
the banks are ‘all the same’, and that they are just the objects of uncaring 
marketing manipulation.  
In sum, leaving aside general problems in contemporary marketing discourse (e.g. 
the rather patronising view of the ‘sovereign consumer’ as a passive, manipulable, 
rather undersocialised actor), competitive pressures on profitability and consumer 
inertia will have a range of sector-wide consequences, as organisations all shift 
their attention towards particular products and customer segments. In the 
segmentation model spelled out by Gordon, where options defined in accounting 
terms as ‘costly’ or ‘unprofitable’ options are selected out, the poorest groups in 
society are once again, but in a new way, marginalised within financial services.4 
Boyce (2000:650-651) neatly sums up how this is a product of a marketing 
perspective: 
‘The implications of the use of customer valuation are immediately obvious from the 
marketing perspective, with the potential to selectively target promotional campaigns at 
“high value” customers, but the literature has been silent on other social implications 
including differential pricing and product and service levels to different customer groups, 
and downright exclusion of certain customers’. 
But once again the way in which the sector-wide outcome is constructed at the 
micro-level of practices within each organisation can be read off: ‘valuation’, ‘high 
value’, differential ‘pricing’ and ‘product and service levels’ are all calculated, in 
each organisation, in each specific case, via accounting practices.  
Not surprisingly, if one goes behind the upbeat claims made in the annual Reports, 
accounting practices can be seen as having this range of effects within Banco 
Lusitano. The focussing on segmentation and differentiation is implemented via 
the financial and non-financial performance numbers available, to enable the 
market-led strategy to operate. The discursive consequences then play out in very 
much the way just indicated.  
                                                     
3 Gordon (1998:40-46) suggests that organisations should ‘decide the customer mix and the level of 
resources to be committed to each customer’ (p.41). This requires that organisations know the ‘cost-
to-serve’ of each customer to be able to obtain an integrated view of customer profitability. He 
claims that it is ‘appropriate’ to map customers according to their current and future profitability. 
Organisations should reward and invest in ‘ideal’ customers (profitable now and into the future) by 
assigning them the best staff, giving them more service time, providing access to new technologies, 
and rewarding them financially. Customers that are currently profitable, but potentially unprofitable, 
need to be managed to ensure the continuation of profitability. Customers that are currently 
unprofitable, but potentially profitable, should be disciplined either by changing the processes used 
to service them (cost reduction), or by charging them a fee. Gordon claims that ‘some customers are 
unprofitable today, will be unprofitable tomorrow and do not merit further attention by the company. 
Let them become someone else’s problem or opportunity. Fire them’ (p.46, emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, he stresses that ‘terminated customers, like terminated employees, should leave 
feeling good about the relationship in which both have invested but which, for whatever reason, no 
longer create the value now important to you’. 
4 Hooley and Mann (1988) claim that the selection of ‘profitable’ customers and the ‘selecting out’ of 
others can partially be attributed to managerial short-termism or the predominance of  ‘non-
marketing’ priorities within organisations. But if the question is then asked as to how that ‘short-
termism’ and ‘non-marketing’ orientation is constructed, the answer that confronts us is ‘via 
accounting’.  
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So there are managers who recognise that not all customers are profitable and 
therefore the bank needs to identify them and take measures when appropriate. A 
manager from one of the marketing departments summarises the overall impact of 
the new marketing-led strategic discourse well in the following comments: 
‘The Excellence Project brought the vision that not all customers are equal. There are 
segments that are potentially profitable and there are others that have a marginal 
profitability almost null or even negative. It is worth using commercial resources, time 
and support sales instruments to some customers: corporate, private, and those with 
potential. While to others it is not worth to invest on them… we should try to manage 
them (externalise) in order to become profitable’ 
‘The branch should be a sales centre and staff there should occupy the majority of the 
time in selling and advising customers. They cannot, as they do today, occupy most of 
their time with non-value activities. Certain operative and administrative activities 
should be automated. There is a bureaucratic activity load that should be externalised 
from the branches’. 
‘The bank has a credit project, that reports directly to the executive committee, to re-
evaluate all credit processes, reorganise and simplify them. The project would permit 
more adequate pricing decisions according to the customer’s profile’.  
As one progresses through these successive comments, all from one interview, it 
is possible to see how far accounting has become implicated in this manager’s 
discourse, at the heart of marketing-led strategy. How does the bank determine 
the ‘non-equality’ of customers in terms of profitability? Via some form of 
accounting metric (and this will be the case, regardless of whether in academic 
terms the metric chosen is of greater or lesser relevance to the task). How are 
‘non-value activities’ to be determined? Via some form of ‘activity’ costing (and 
again this will be the case, whether or not a formal ABC system has been 
developed, as happened in Banco Lusitano with the SOI). How, once credit rating 
is fixed upon as a key feature of customer differentiation, does the bank achieve 
the two necessary requirements – the ‘simplification’ of the credit scoring process, 
and the relevant pricing decision for each product or service? ‘Simplification’ 
requires an adequate means of determining the relevant activities, and pricing 
requires an appropriate full product costing system. With those objectives now at 
the heart of discourse, a system like the old SOI one is increasingly likely to be 
perceived as ‘inadequate’. The stage is set for ABC, or a system like it, to be 
embraced as ‘the solution’, particularly if there are consultants on hand to offer it.  
In such ways we can see how accounting is in the first instance important in a 
general way as the means by which the discourses of strategy and marketing get 
implemented. But further, we can see why a form such as ABC could have become 
so significant in this sector, given the kind of marketing-led strategy being 
pursued so widely. However, that poses a major organisational problem, as the 
new accounting required is such a long way from the traditional form of internal 
accounting systems and practices with which bank employees had typically been 
familiar. There is not simply an issue here of introducing a new form of accounting 
technology that will meet the demands of the marketing-led strategy. There is an 
issue of unlearning an allegiance to old practices, or perhaps learning how to align 
the old and the new. This is not a straightforward process. 
Confronting this kind of situation, one can appreciate Miller’s (1994:1-5) claim that 
accounting has to be regarded as a social and institutional practice with three 
complementary dimensions. First, accounting as a technology is a device for acting 
upon activities, and providing visibility to events and processes. Both the ‘old’ and 
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‘new’ modes of accounting here operate in this dimension. But secondly, he 
argues, accounting includes discourse representations and vocabularies. These 
rationales  
‘come to constitute truths in the name of which organizations are to be remade, 
processes reconfigured, and attempts made to redefine the identity of individuals. Once 
established, these truths come to be taken as essential for the proper government of 
economic and social life’ (p.4). 
In this respect, there is arguably one kind of ‘truth’ represented by the old style of 
budget-focussed accounting in the bank, which has a stewardship kind of concern 
which can primarily ensure that there is an equitable and efficient allocation of 
available resources, given the current strategy (whatever that may be). Such a 
model can year on year track the use of resources and report back on them, and 
serve to validate a given strategy, particularly so long as that strategy remains 
valid for successive periods.  
But such an accounting is very poor at dealing with a world where strategies have 
to change, as competitors compete away short-term advantages rapidly. In this 
context, the need is for a more proactive and immediate understanding of the 
costs of internal activities and of the products and services supported by them, so 
that informed decisions about possible changes in strategy can be made swiftly. 
Here a different kind of accounting ‘truth’ begins to obtain, which requires a set of 
practices that will meet the above criteria. ABC articulates such a ‘truth’, in a much 
better way than traditional budget-focussed accounting, as it makes visible 
internal activity costs. It is similarly superior at providing numbers that ‘you can 
trust’ (as the research and consultancy rhetoric has it) concerning product/service 
costs. Again, traditional overhead allocation models are simply very poor at this 
game. So the logic of ABC, as Piper and Walley (1991) argued, may remain 
questionable. But as an accounting ‘truth’, in a world where the financial sector 
has altered in such a way that marketing-led strategy discourse is king, it 
dominates older accounting truths.  
In this way, accounting discourse can operate significantly in a third dimension, 
that of shaping the whole way that the ‘economic domain’ is conceptualised and 
articulated. Miller’s thesis here is that accounting provides ways to constitute and 
reconstitute the economic domain by the changing calculative practices that 
provide the basis for knowing ‘economic reality’. 
‘By transforming the physical flows of organizations into financial flows, accounting 
creates a particular realm of economic calculation of which judgements can be made, 
actions taken or justified, policies devised, and disputes generated and adjudicated’ 
(p.4). 
The particular point here is that, if accounting in general has these effects, the 
particular kind of accounting encapsulated in ABC creates a distinctive version of 
the ‘realm of economic calculation’, and thereby produces particular kinds of 
judgements, actions, policies and disputes, while also providing the calculative 
means of evaluating decisions, adjudicating disputes, etc.5  
The articulation of this new kind of ‘truth’ can be observed in Banco Lusitano, as 
                                                     
5 The general argument is similar to that made in Hopwood (1990), which also emphasises the 
diverse but related roles of accounting in: (1) creating visibility in the organisation; (2) functioning 
as a calculative practice; and (3) playing an active part in creating a domain of economical action. 
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accounting information can be seen to be moderating managerial vocabularies, 
and changing the conception of what is important and what is not. For instance, at 
a range of levels in the bank, the cost to income ratio became newly significant as 
a key target that was referred to as ‘precise’ and ‘objective’. More generally, the 
vocabulary of business, efficiency, profitability, financial strength, international 
expansion and organisation became the basis on which claims of ‘excellent 
progress’ were made. In this discursive context the consultancy discourse of ABC 
fits perfectly. ABC can be made to appear to respond to this new realm and to 
create just the sense of alignment with the new strategic vision that will promote 
the new climate of change in the bank. The following extracts from one of the first 
Consultancy Reports for the ABC project illustrate this perfectly: 
‘It is expected that ABC techniques will be applied in the near future in the bank, similar 
to what is happening in the international banking sector. The main reason for the use of 
ABC is the need to evaluate the performance of the operations in a dynamic 
environment, for which the traditional accounting tools are less efficient. This 
performance is measured by the costs of activities consumed by certain cost objects. 
The only way to keep or increase the profitability of the bank is through cost reduction, 
and the increase of the offer of value-added services to its customers in terms of quality, 
time response or innovation. To reach higher profitability it is fundamental to eliminate 
activities that do not increase the value added to customers.  
To monitor the performance of the bank and to support decision-making, it is necessary 
to have information about cost, quality and time measures at the bank, team and 
individual levels. 
Information about costs should: (1) provide the current position; (2) support the 
identification of the causes of inefficiency; (3) measure the efficacy of short-term actions 
to solve inefficiencies; and (4) display the existing range of similar and repetitive 
activities. It will be necessary to adopt a costing methodology that will capture this 
information for any cost objects that management needs to analyse or measure, such as 
customers, services or products’ (Consultancy Reports: ABC Project).   
Thus we can see how far the kind of analysis made by Hopwood (1990), Miller 
(1994) and with reference to ABC by Ezzamel et al. (1990), is borne out in this 
banking context, regarding the accounting role. Accounting can be seen at the 
heart of what gets said, influencing perceptions, changing vocabulary and infusing 
the dialogue that circulates both formally and informally, because the concepts 
expressed in ABC discourse ‘make sense’ for actors within the bank. Secondly, it 
makes new profitability and customer-oriented issues visible, while older concerns 
focussed on budgets and internal procedures recede from view. In this way, it is 
easier for top management to convince employees of the importance of the 
change initiatives that are going on. Thirdly, it provides a ‘legitimisation’ of job 
losses, presenting them as inevitable to the bank’s adaptation to the evolving 
competitive environment (which is now defined as the European Union and global). 
In this range of ways, accounting plays a key role in re-shaping the everyday 
reality of employees, making it inescapable for the ‘lucky’ remaining employees, 
and all the new hires brought in to make the new vision work, that they must 
accept (whether reluctantly or with enthusiasm) the new performance goals.  
Finally, we can also suggest that accounting contributes to promoting an image of 
being modern and well-managed that can be grasped and shared across different 
bank levels, even when there is scepticism about how well it is being realised. So a 
manager from the organisation department, after claiming that top management 
does not support ABC because they do not see efficiency as a key issue, modifies 
his statement, drawing on the ‘image’ metaphor: 
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‘Probably I am giving a negative image of the top management of the bank, and those 
responsible for its strategy. They are aware of the efficiency problem. After all, it was 
considered more than two years ago a strategic issue. Therefore, we are all conscious of 
the problems over competition and margin reduction, and that we cannot rest on the 
laurels given by the bank's past profits, we all have to realise that is no guarantee of 
continued success. It is just that there has been priority given to other areas’. 
To sum up, it is apparent that discourses of strategy, marketing and accounting 
are all circulating out there and so have migrated into the banking sector, with not 
insignificant help from consultant companies. It is apparent that within Banco 
Lusitano, as elsewhere, the discourse and practices of accounting have significant 
roles to play, with an increasing presence of the ABC type of approach under the 
current form of marketing-led strategy. A new kind of managerial culture can be 
celebrated as a result, as one more extract from the 1999 Annual Report and 
Accounts confirms: 
‘The Group’s mission is to extend to its clientele – private and corporate clients as well 
as institutional clients – a high degree of satisfaction by providing financial services that 
meet the market’s ever-growing requirements in terms of information and 
sophistication. 
In addition to our institution’s GROWTH, the strategic goals defined privilege its 
transformation into the BEST and MOST PROFITABLE Financial Group operating in 
Portugal. Hence, and although the creation of value for the shareholders constitutes a 
basic concern, the interests of both customers and employees are also duly taken into 
account’ (Report and Accounts, 1999, original emphasis). 
In such statements accounting is no longer present simply in the back office 
functions with which it is traditionally identified, the financial and management 
accounting systems and practices used to run the old-style budget-focussed 
approach and to generate the financial reports. Accounting is both different 
technically, it is more visibly present in the formal discourse and strategic plans of 
top management, and it is circulating as part of a new kind of management 
discourse in the organisation. 
7. Conclusions 
The main contribution of this research is related to the increase in the visibility and 
perceived importance of accounting in this particular bank. As the organisation has 
changed, accounting has become more significant. Since the re-privatisation, and 
more specifically over the period when the ABC initiative was being promoted and 
developed, accounting becomes more visible in the organisation and so perceived, 
at the level of what people say and write, as important to it. The research shows 
how, with the arrival of ABC, what becomes sayable internally includes alongside 
the two ‘obvious’ discourses of strategy and marketing, a new kind of extensive 
and intensive accounting discourse. The discourses of strategy, marketing and 
accounting ‘migrated’ into the banking sector, in particular over the last decade, 
with consultants having a key role in this process. Discursively, accounting 
permeates the organisation, alongside and inside marketing and strategy 
discourse. Measures of accounting, such as the ratio of cost to income, are crucial 
as, for instance, strategy uses them (intensive significance). ‘Old’ accounting is 
still out there but now it is more than that (extensive significance). It makes new 
profitability and customer-oriented issues visible, while other concerns focussed on 
budgets and internal procedures recede from view. From the traditional roles, 
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preparation of external reports and preparation of the budget, accounting is 
migrating outside the accounting department, for instance through the SOI, and 
specially with the development of the new MIS that includes the ABC system (see 
figure 2, next page). The impact of the ABC initiative was to produce, as an 
unintended consequence, a general visibility and significance for all forms of 
accounting in use. As the unit of analysis changed from branches to products, 
customers and distribution channels, a range of performance measurement and 
accountability practices became more essential and inevitable. New MAS needed to 
be developed in order to work with the new managerial reality.   
The study provides new insights into how management accounting practices and 
discourses, along with other organisational systems, play an important role 
questioning, visualising, analysing, and measuring implemented strategies. These 
practices and discourses have an important influence on strategic decision-making, 
and help to legitimise action. As the language and practice of management have 
shifted towards strategy and marketing discourses, patterns of work, organisation 
and career are being restructured. There was a transformation from a bank culture 
based on relative job security and, for some, hierarchical careers, to another 
based more on the strategic marketing discourse of interpersonal customer-
orientated skills with individual performance. Task redefinition was another 
consequence, associated with the use of new technologies and the increasing 
range of services offered. There was a strongly felt sense of rapidly changing 
employment practices, as an IT manager explains ‘things are changing fast and 
there are people that adapt easily, while others have difficulties in terms of 
adaptation’. Consequently, there are tensions and a feeling of insecurity inside the 
bank. Tensions, for instance, between the branch network and central 
departments, and between staff with experience and a young, flexible and more 
educated generation. Redundancies, IT innovations, and several change initiatives 
undermined the sense of employment security that was a central aspect of the 
Portuguese banking culture. 
There is an increased appreciation of the importance of accounting, since it is 
significant beyond its technical roles. Accounting is increasingly important in the 
‘doing’ of management generally, including strategy and marketing. Accounting is 
contestable for it is a means of distributing new modes of acting and 
thinking/speaking across the organisation. Cost and resource levels become areas 
of conflict and debate (this is not necessary the same, since debate is not always 
conflictual). New discourses of value (e.g. in terms of value added) can be 
mobilised even as it becomes clear that precise measures of value added or 
profitability remain elusive or the subject of dispute. 
 
Figure 1 – Structure of activity based costing project 
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Figure 2 – Evolution of the role accounting plays in the bank 
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